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The legal regime governing the recovery of deep seabed miner-
als may be the most difficult issue now confronting the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Congressman Murphy
discusses unilateral legislation, concluding that it would be fully
consonant with prevailing international law and that it would
act as a spur to the negotiations of the Conference. He analyzes
the Deep Seabed Mining bill in the contexts of the international
legal system and the Law of the Sea Conference and urges the
United States to enact the bill so that exploration and commer-
cial recovery may proceed.
On September 15, 1978, the curtain came down on the Seventh
Session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III). The Seventh Session ended on a note that
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combined disappointment and hope--disappointment that the na-
tions of the world had not reached full agreement on a new Law
of the Sea; hope that the next session, to be held in Geneva in the
spring of 1979,1 will make major progress toward resolution of the
differences that now separate the negotiating nations.
The Third United Nations Conference is now five years old and
has produced conditional agreement on a wide range of issues.
The nations of the world have, in general, resolved most of their
differences on such issues as a regime for protection of the
marine environment, preservation of the freedom of the high seas
for traditional uses like navigation and the laying of undersea
cables and pipelines, the right of transit through straits and
archipelagic waters, and the establishment of an oceanic eco-
nomic zone for coastal States. However, some important issues
remain unsettled. The condition for agreement on these matters
is the successful conclusion of negotiations on the Conference's
most difficult and intractable issue: the establishment of a regime
for deep seabed mining.
Ocean mining has been seriously debated since the earliest pre-
paratory work of the Conference, but the parties--essentially, the
developed world on the one hand and the developing nations 2 on
the other-remain almost as far apart as ever. The issue is proba-
bly the single largest constraint in the way of final agreement on a
new Law of the Sea, and the rift between the developed and de-
1. Informal discussions among the UNCLOS delegates indicate the
probability of a follow-up session in New York at the end of summer, 1979.
2. Variously named the Third World or the "Group of 77" (G-77), these coun-
tries now total some 119 nations. The "G-77" nomenclature emerged from the Sec-
ond Session of UNCLOS I in Caracas in 1974. Although far from cohesive on
many specific matters, the G-77 has articulated a viewpoint of developing nations
with respect to most of the issues at the Conference. It is organized into a series
of subcommittees and caucuses to reach, in most cases, a single position.
To cast the deep seabed mining issue as being totally within a bi-polar dialogue
between the developing and developed nations is clearly an oversimplification.
The Soviet Union, for example, supports the Third World on some seabed issues.
Within the G-77, positions reflect various stages of development, and political ide-
ologies range from moderate to militant. Perceived interests among the approxi-
mately 50 participating nations vary considerably. However, UNCLOS Ill works
by a process of "consensus"--no votes have been taken on any Article or provi-
sion, and none will be until the possibilities of consensus have been exhausted.
This process tends to result in dichotomization of conceptual issues. Empirical
analysis of blocs and cleavages at the Conference will be more easily facilitated
when, and if, actual votes on specific treaty language occur. Although much of the
debate has focused on proposed negotiating text language (see text accompanying
notes 24-28 infra), the consensus format makes attributions of individual nations'
positions on specific language impracticable and, thus, "bloc-analysis" impossible.
This article focuses on the general political, philosophical, and conceptual
processes at the Conference; the developing-developed division is useful because
it reflects this level of debate.
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veloping nations threatens to bring UNCLOS I to an inconse-
quential end.
In the last year or two, the argument has been advanced that
the basic interest of the United States would not suffer if the Con-
ference failed to reach agreement on a treaty.3 But the United
States, which was one of the moving forces behind the convening
of UNCLOS I, remains committed to the concept of a new, com-
prehensive, and global Law of the Sea Convention. Many, both
within and outside the Congress, feel that those who are advo-
cates for unilateral action on the part of the United States with re-
spect to ocean mining legislation are, in reality, opposed to a
successful UNCLOS III. Nothing is further from the truth. Do-
mestic legislation, at this time, is not incompatible with an inter-
national agreement and may actually "spur" such an agreement.
Most observers agree that it is important that the United States
continue to seek agreement on a treaty-not only for the sake of
its substantive provisions, but also for purposes of international
comity.
DEEP OCEAN MINERALS: MARKETS AND PRICES
Why has deep seabed mining become the primary obstacle to a
successful UNCLOS 11? For some time, the world has known
that the deep seabed is rich in hard minerals-primarily manga-
nese, iron, nickel, copper, and cobalt, but also lesser amounts of
other minerals. 4 These minerals are contained in nodules on the
floor of the seabed, generally at depths greater than 2,000 meters.
The present estimate is that there are at least 1.5 trillion tons of
these nodules, most of them lying on the floor of the Pacific
Ocean. Until recently, they were regarded as beyond the reach of
commercial mining operations because of the ocean depths in-
volved. But modern technology has now made them accessible.
Over the past decade, the mining industry has moved toward an
economically feasible capability to mine the hard minerals of the
deep seabed. This developing technology has made the prospect
of deep seabed mining on a commercial scale an imminent reality.
3. This assessment is best stated in Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking
U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 373 (1977).
4. In all, some 31 mineral elements have been found in manganese nodules.
See Cardwell, Extractive Metallurgy of Ocean Nodules, lImmG CONGRESS J., Nov.,
1973, at 38.
For the United States, four minerals-manganese, cobalt, nick-
el, and copper-have an immediate strategic and economic impor-
tance. They are vital to American industry. Manganese is an
essential element in the production of steel, and cobalt and nickel
are important in the manufacture of many critical alloys. Copper,
of course, has a wide range of significant uses. At the present
time, the United States is dependent on foreign sources for much
of these minerals. It now imports all the manganese and cobalt it
consumes, seventy-one percent of the nickel, and fifteen percent
of the copper. Additionally, imports make a sizeable contribution
to the present deficit in the American balance of payments. In
1976, the United States paid $1.5 billion to foreign sources for the
importation of these four minerals.5
This dependence on foreign suppliers for critical minerals
places the United States' national economy and security in a posi-
tion of considerable risk. The risk is compounded by the fragility
of some of the sources. More than three-quarters of the cobalt
consumed by the United States comes from a single African na-
tion-Zaire, a country that in recent years has been beset by civil
unrest and outbreaks of armed conflict. It is a condition that al-
ways threatens the stability of production. Production can also be
disrupted by artificial market forces. Although it may be uncer-
tain whether the producing countries of any of the four minerals
could form a cartel on the OPEC model,6 some evidence exists
that prices reflect more than normal market forces-that, in fact,
they are administered. The prices of manganese and cobalt, for
example, have risen markedly since 1970,7 far outstripping the
rise in mining costs. With administered prices come short-term
shortages that interrupt the steady flow of minerals on which the
5. In many respects, the most important elements are manganese and cobalt,
of which the United States has no domestic supply. With respect to nickel, the
United States has only one small exploitable deposit-a source that is able to sup-
ply only a small proportion of its total nickel needs.
6. Economic theorists continue to argue about a proper specification of the
conditions under which cartels can emerge. Yet, it must be recognized that the
OPEC embargo of 1973 was not predicted. This lack of predictability leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the assumption of cartelization would be a rational
and reasonable basis on which to structure future resources policies for the
United States.
7. Even before the recent tragedies in Zaire, the necessity of depending on a
quasi-monopolistic supply for an essential metal illustrates the serious conse-
quences for world consumers. Since 1970, manganese prices have increased some
170%. During this same period, cobalt has gone from $2.45 to $20.00 per pound-an
increase of 716%. The overall United States economy during these years, as indi-
cated by Department of Commerce GNP price data, experienced a 46% inflation
rate. HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, REPORT ON DEEP SEABED
HARD MINERALS ACT, .R. REP. No. 588 pt. 1, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1977).
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industrialized nations rely. If stockpiles are low, the repercus-
sions can be severe.
For the United States and for other nations, the development of
deep seabed mining is crucial. If a satisfactory legal regime can
be developed, it will ensure a continuous and stable supply of
manganese, cobalt, nickel, and copper. The short-term implica-
tions are clear: The threat of shortages during critical periods will
vanish, and a national market for the setting of world prices will
come into being. Also, looking ahead, it is clear that the deep sea-
bed may become the world's major source of supply for manga-
nese, cobalt, and nickel-with a supply that will be sufficient to
meet the world's needs for the foreseeable future.
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE DEEP SEABED
For the Group of 77 (G-77), the hard minerals of the deep sea-
bed are important not so much for their own sake but rather as a
new source-and a vast one-of incremental wealth. These States
are concerned that the United States and other industrialized
countries developing ocean mining technology will begin the
commercial-recovery stage of the operation before they can lock
the developed world into a certain type of regime for the manage-
ment of the deep seabed.8 They argue vigorously that the status
of international law today with respect to the resources of the
seabed precludes any nation from recovering the manganese nod-
ules in the absence of a global agreement.
The most compelling legal arguments, however, are made on
behalf of those who support deep seabed resource development
for any nation with the capability to recover such resources com-
mercially. Although this article is not intended to present a defin-
itive legal analysis of the status of international law on this
subject, it is important to outline briefly the premises on which
the United States' position is based because these same premises
form the foundation of its domestic ocean mining legislation.
Juridical Status of the Seabed
Prior to the development of the continental shelf doctrine,9 in-
8. Some general aspects of the regime advocated by the G-77 will be dis-
cussed below.
9. Codified in Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958,
[1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.IAS. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
ternational law made no distinction between the continental shelf
and the deep seabed. The prior customary international law,
then, treated all the resources of submerged lands beyond the ter-
ritorial sea as being open to any nation to exploit.'0 With the 1958
Geneva codification and emergence of a rule of customary law,
these resources remained subject to exclusive national appropria-
tion under the continental shelf regime. With respect to re-
sources beyond the shelf not covered by the Geneva Convention,
prior customary international law remains in effect. The deep
seabed and superjacent waters are a juridical unity. Conse-
quently, the resources of the seabed beyond the continental shelf,
such as manganese nodules, are available for development by any
nation.
The Freedom of the High Seas
Under Article 2 of the Geneva High Seas Convention," which is
generally declaratory of principles of international law, the devel-
opment of deep seabed resources is a freedom of the high seas.
Article 2 provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.
Although not specifically mentioned, other freedoms are encom-
passed by Article 2. These include the freedom to develop manga-
nese resources of the deep seabed, as the legislative history of the
10. One juridical theory was that the seabed and its resources were res
nullius, or the property of no one, and therefore subject to appropriation on the
basis of occupation-that is, use pursuant to legal claim and national administra-
tion. T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 696-98 (1911); Hurst, Whose is the
Bed of the Sea?, [1923-24] 4 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 33, 42-43 (1923); Young, The Legal
Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 641, 644-45 (1968). A competing
theory was that the seabed was res communis, or not subject to exclusive appro-
priation. Under this theory, resources were res nullius and could be exploited by
anyone if not under claim of exclusive rights. I. BROWNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAw 229 (2d ed. 1973); C. COLOMBOs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEA § 81 (6th rev. ed. 1967).
11. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.IA.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
This treaty is in force for the United States and for most other key countries.
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Convention clearly shows.12 That the listed freedoms of the high
seas are nonexclusive and that seabed mining is within the scope
of Article 2 is supported by the following:
First, the phrase "[t]hese freedoms, and others which are recog-
nized by the general principles of international law," in conjunc-
tion with the discussion regarding prior customary international
law,13 indicates quite clearly that access to the resources of the
deep seabed is covered by the general principles of international
law.
Second, the International Law Commission (ILC) travaux
pr~paratoires from 1955 associated with Article 2 state inter alia:
The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not re-
strictive; the Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms.
It is aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to explore or
exploit the subsoil of the high seas and freedom to engage in scientific re-
search therein. It is evident that in the high seas covering a continental
shelf the latter freedoms can only be exercised subject to any rights over
that shelf which the coastal State can invoke. The Commission did not
study this problem in detail at the seventh session.
14
In its report a year later, the ILC stated, with respect to the ab-
sence of reference to deep seabed minerals, that:
The Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom to explore
or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that apart from the
case of the exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continen-
tal shelf.., such exploitation has not yet assumed sufficient practical im-
12. 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (18th mtg.) 45, 45, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958); id.
(17th mtg.) 40, 43; id. (16th mtg.) 38, 38; id. (15th mtg.) 35, 37; id. (12th mtg.) 26, 31;
id. (6th mtg.) 7, 7, 8; Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 24, art. 27 commentary, U.N. Doc. A/3159
(1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INrr'L L. CONM'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/
SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957); Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 10 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 3, art. 2 commentary, U.N. Doc.
A/2934 (1955), reprinted in [19551 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 19, 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1955/Add. 1 (1960); Summary Records of the 329th Meeting, [19551
1 Y.B. INT'L L. COmm'N 279, 282-83, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1955 (1960); Summary
Records of the 326th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. INr'L L. COmm'N 261, 263, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 (1960); Summary Records of the 320th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B.
INT'L I CONM'N 220, 222, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 (1960); Summary Records
of the 113th Meeting, [19511 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COM'N 266, 269, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1951 (1957); Summary Records of the 67th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COWaa'N 216, 222, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 (1958). For a full discussion, see T.
KRONmILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING ch. 4 (in process).
13. See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
14. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 10
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 3, art. 2 commentary, U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted
in [1955] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 19, 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955/Add. 1
(1960).
portance to justify special regulation.15
It is clear, then, that the ILC recognized deep seabed resource
exploitation as a high seas freedom. Its failure to be specific re-
sulted from nothing more than the fact that such activity had "not
yet assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special reg-
ulation."
The developing nations argue that the freedoms of the high
seas do not extend to the seabed beyond national territorial lim-
its-that there has never been a right under international law to
exploit the deep seabed. The position of the G-77 has a negative
premise: that there is neither a precedent in international law for
unilateral access to the deep seabed nor a treaty expressly con-
ferring on individual nations a right of such access. Because of its
negative premise, it seems more a political than a legal argument.
There is nothing to support the view of the G-77 that the tradi-
tional freedoms of the high seas do not extend to the resources of
the deep seabed.
United Nations Resolutions
Finally, it must be noted that the developing nations also argue
that, whatever the pre-existing rule of international law, the right
of an individual nation to engage in deep seabed mining is now
limited by actions taken by the nations of the world within the
General Assembly of the United Nations.
In an earlier phase of this debate, the G-77 relied, in part, on the
so-called Moratorium Resolution. This resolution was adopted by
the General Assembly by a vote of sixty-two to twenty-eight, with
twenty-eight abstentions, on December 15, 1969. In relevant part,
it provides that:
The General Assembly,
Declares that, pending the establishment of the aforementioned interna-
tional regime:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from
all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and
ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion;
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recog-
nized.
16
The United States and other industrial nations cast their votes
against the resolution. They did so because of the obvious impli-
15. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 24, art. 27 commentary (2), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), re-
printed in [19561 2 Y.B. IqL I Com'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1956/Add. 1 (1957).
16. GAL Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 11, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
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cations of the resolution-that the industrial world might have to
accept an unsatisfactory international regime on deep seabed
mining in order to commence or participate in some type of min-
ing operations or refrain indefinitely from all such activity. Either
outcome would run counter to the essential interests of nations
and companies that have taken major risks to develop seabed
technology.
In the past, the G-77 has advanced the view that the Morato-
rium Resolution created a binding legal obligation on all States.
The answer of the United States was that it never assented to the
resolution and that its rights under international law could not be
modified without its consent. Moreover, by itself, a resolution of
the United Nations General Assembly has no binding effect in in-
ternational law.17 The answer has apparently been largely effec-
tive. At the closing of the Seventh Session of UNCLOS In, the G-
77, in attacking the concept of unilateral deep seabed mining leg-
islation, made little mention of the Moratorium Resolution.
The Third World's legal argument against deep seabed mining
is now based almost exclusively on the so-called Declaration of
Principles. This statement was adopted by the General Assembly
on December 17, 1970, by a vote of 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions.
The United States voted in favor of the Declaration, which states
in relevant part that:
The General Assembly,
Solemnly declares that
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as
the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by
States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise
sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
3. No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or ac-
quire rights with respect to the area or its resources incompatible with the
international regime to be established and the principles of this Declara-
tion.
4. All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation of the re-
sources of the area and other related activities shall be governed by the
international regime to be established.
7. The exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of
17. W. BISHOP, INTERNATiONAL LAW 46-51 (3d ed. 1971); Gross, The Development
of International Law Through the United Nations, in THE UNTED NATIONs 171, 198-
203 (J. Barros ed. 1972).
the geographical location of States, whether land-locked or coastal, and
taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the devel-
oping countries.
9. On the basis of the principles of this Declaration, an international
regime applying to the area and its resources and including appropriate
international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be established
by an international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon.
The r~gime shall, inter alia, provide for the orderly and safe development
and rational management of the area and its resources and for expanding
opportunities in the use thereof, and ensure the equitable sharing by
States in the benefits derived therefrom, taking into particular considera-
tion the interests and needs of the developing countries, whether land-
locked or coastal. 18
What do these words mean? What was intended by the assenting
nations? What is the legal status of the Declaration and the prin-
ciples it embodies?
The language of the Declaration of Principles is filled with gen-
eralities and ambiguities, and the history of its formulation makes
it clear that such uncertainties were purposeful. They were
designed to obscure the differences among the nations of the
world-to permit each party to the Declaration to interpret it in
accordance with its political and legal position. The language of
the Declaration is, as a result, far from clear, but it was accepted
by the assenting nations as a compromise. The irony is that this
language, which was fashioned to permit the developed and the
developing nations to preserve their positions, has been seized
upon by the G-77 as the primary basis of its view that no State
may unilaterally develop the resources of the deep seabed.
The parties to the Declaration agree on one thing-that it repre-
sents their commitment to work out an international regime for
ocean mining. But the G-77 goes much further. Its position is
that the Declaration itself established a moratorium on mining,
pending the new regime. However, for the United States and the
rest of the developed world, the Declaration was not intended to
create a moratorium. It did no more than set out the significant
principles that should govern a future regime. The United States
expressed this view when it voted for the Declaration, and it con-
tinues to regard the view of the G-77 as an interpretation that did
not have universal support when the Declaration came into being.
The history of the Declaration supports the position of the United
States. In any event, like other similar resolutions, the Declara-
tion was not lawmaking.19
The G-77 makes much of the term "the common heritage of
18. G. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
19. See MANUAL OF PUBLIC INERNATIONAL LAw 160-61 (M. Sdrensen ed. 1968);
Sloan, The Binding Force of a 'Recommendation' of the General Assembly of the
United Nations, [1948] 25 Barr. Y.B. IN"L L 1 (1962).
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mankind." It takes the view that the term connotes collective
ownership of the resources of the deep seabed-that they are the
common property of all nations and can be exploited only with
universal consent. At the time of adoption of the Declaration, the
term had no legal definition, and there was no universal agree-
ment on its meaning when the Declaration was formulated. The
United States has always regarded it as a concept for which a le-
gal meaning would emerge in the course of UNCLOS HI negotia-
tions and be legally defined in the text of any treaty that resulted
from those negotiations.
In general, then, the position of the United States (both in its
diplomatic negotiations at UNCLOS and as a premise for domes-
tic ocean mining legislation) is that access to the deep seabed and
the opportunity to recover commercially resources from it is a
freedom of the high seas. All nations, under existing law, have a
right to exercise this freedom subject only to the restriction that
there be no unreasonable interference with the exercise of high
seas freedoms by other nations. Commitments to the establish-
ment of an international regime for the management of the area
and its resources have been made, but in the interim, no morato-
rium exists or was intended.
After an exhaustive review of international law on this subject,
one observer recently stated:
Substantial authoritative evidence, bolstered by an analysis of the func-
tion of international law, supports the application of high seas principles
to deep seabed mining. Thus, mining of the deep seabed with reasonable
regard for others is lawful, but exclusive mining claims. . .are not ....
... [H]ighseasprinciples-indicate.thatdeep seabed mining is legal even
now and will continue to be legal if the current Law of the Sea Conference
fails.
2 0
Conversely, taken as a whole, the legal arguments made by the
G-77 are weak and without substance. They are based on a view
of traditional international law that has no basis in history, on a
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly to which the
United States did not assent, and on an interpretation of another
resolution that was deliberately drafted so that it would not
prejudice the positions of the interested parties.
20. Burton, Freedom of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed
Mining Claims, 29 STAN. I REV. 1135, 1180 (1977).
AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME: DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS AT
UNCLOS III
The years of debate at UNCLOS HI about an acceptable struc-
ture for the control of the deep seabed represents the Confer-
ence's own very important version of the North-South dialogue.
The philosophical underpinnings of the Third World's theory of a
"New International Economic Order"2 1 are the basis of discussion
regarding the development of deep ocean minerals. The unique
dimension of this dialogue at UNCLOS III is, of course, that the
negotiations are focused on the resources of an area of the earth
which is beyond the jurisdiction of any nation. Consequently, the
UNCLOS Ill debate does not emphasize such matters as in-
creased trade, underwriting Third World projects, loans, grants, or
the type of terms normally associated with the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund.
Rather, the establishment of an international regime for the ex-
ploitation of deep seabed minerals represents a singular effort not
found in other world fora. If widespread agreement can be
reached with respect to the creation of an International Seabed
Authority and the necessary administrative and operational ma-
chinery that will be required to implement such a structure, it
will undoubtedly form a strong precedent for future worldwide in-
stitution-building to deal with the complex problems of resource
scarcity in a high technology era. The implications of this possi-
bility are, of course, enormous, and they argue strongly for a
United States position based on a careful balance between our in-
ternational obligations as a world power and our fundamental
economic interests.
Clearly, an explanation of the continuing struggle at the Confer-
ence with respect to ocean mining is multi-dimensional. The diffi-
cult issues to be resolved, the structure of the Conference, the
personality clashes, and the protective position of land-based
mineral producers (within the G-77) have all contributed to the
present stalemate.
Perhaps the two primary explanatory variables are: (1) the
21. Perhaps the best analysis of the relationship between the emergence, in
the 1960's and 1970's, of resource and other wealth-distribution questions con-
tained in the concept of a New International Economic Order and UNCLOS I is
found in Friedheim & Durch, The International Seabed Resources Agency Negotia-
tions and the New International Economic Order (paper prepared for delivery at
the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago,
Illinois, September 2-5, 1976). The researchers were then associated with the
Center for Naval Analyses, which is affiliated with the University of Rochester.
Their analytical and forecasting models, which predicted continued "stalemate" at
UNCLOS II, have been remarkably accurate.
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radically different economic ideologies between the industrial
nations that are developing mining technology and the developing
world, and (2) a feeling on the part of most nations at the Confer-
ence-a feeling which has developed into an important strategic
position-that the industrial world will continue to delay full-
scale deep seabed mining activities until UNCLOS III has
reached a successful conclusion.
With respect to the different ideologies represented at the Con-
ference, it would be misleading to categorize the struggle as one
between capitalism and socialism. Each country has a different
economic mix, including those within the "industrial bloc," and
positions on any given issue are based on a myriad of factors.
Yet, in a general but critically important way, there is a signifi-
cant difference in the premises on which each large group at the
Conference views the "politics of manganese nodules." The Third
World, based on the political strategy contained in the concept of
the "New International Economic Order," calls for the redistribu-
tion of the world's wealth with significant transference of re-
sources from the developed to the developing world. Certainly,
the distribution of the resources of the deep seabed is a key inter-
national issue in this dialogue.
The industrialized nations, in general, accept the premise that
one shares in the benefits of society largely to the extent that one
shares in the cost. Not only is this considered fair, but it is the
way that a nation improves its standard of living-by investing in
ventures today that will lead to increased national wealth to-
morrow. One important dimension of this premise is that most
investment decisions and risk-taking is done by the private sector
of the economy.
22
The need for large amounts of capital to be provided by invest-
ment companies and the need for positive decisions to proceed
with development of commercial-recovery technology both are
private, corporate decisions. Such decisions, involving hundreds
of millions of dollars for each company, are made carefully and
22. This is not to deny that in each industrialized country pursuing deep sea-
bed mining technology there are many levels of formal and informal subsidies to
companies to encourage their continued participation in this high-risk venture.
The major exception to this situation is the United States, in which no ocean min-
ing policy exists and no effective governmental support is provided. Even the ap-
plication of normal tax "incentives" for new investments and depletion allowances
to ocean mining is uncertain and will require legislative clarification.
only with the high probability of a reasonable return on the in-
vestment. Certainly, the recovery of manganese nodules from
15,000 to 20,000 feet down in the ocean presents enormous
risks-as does the uncertainty of the minerals market at any
given point in time. These are normal technological and economic
risks on which corporations are able to make some predictive
judgments.
However, to make a commitment of capital, labor, and technol-
ogy to a resource-development venture and then to discover that
one does not have access to that resource or must operate under
the most unreasonable terms and conditions is intolerable. The
possibility that such changes in the "rules of the game" may oc-
cur, of course, will severely constrain investment and develop-
ment decisions in the first instance.
The goals of the developed and developing countries at UN-
CLOS III with respect to the deep seabed issue are, therefore,
fundamentally different.
The G-77 advocates the establishment of a unitary structure for
the control and management of seabed development. The mem-
bership of the governing unit of the structure, the International
Seabed Authority, would be based on a one nation, one vote
scheme and, thus, would be controlled by the numerically supe-
rior developing world.
The position of the United States on deep seabed mining is rel-
atively simple. It wants the mineral resources of the deep seabed
developed rapidly and efficiently with due regard to the protec-
tion of the marine environment and to the interests of other na-
tions. It is important that individual States, and organizations
sponsored by States, should have non-discriminatory and assured
access to mining sites, with security of tenure. This view reflects
the United States' awareness that rapid and efficient development
of the mineral resources of the deep seabed will require the par-
ticipation of the private mining industry,23 which has developed
the technological capability for the task at a considerable cost.
The industry has already spent $150 to $200 million on research
and development. The present estimate is that when ocean min-
ing becomes operational, the cost of commercial recovery and
processing will range between $500 and $700 million per site. In
other words, the total cost for four consortia, each operating on
one site, could be as much as $2.8 billion.
23. At present, the "industry" is composed of a small number of international
consortia, some United States-led. In all, about six countries have an interest in
one or more of these consortia.
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Because such substantial sums are involved, it is the United
States' view that any international regime for deep seabed mining
must create a climate conducive to large private investment.
Without such a climate, private investment capital will probably
seek other and very different outlets. At the same time, the
United States believes that the developing world should be af-
forded a meaningful opportunity to reap a just share of the bene-
fits of the resources of the seabed-by participating in mining and
through revenue-sharing.
To accommodate these various goals, the United States has
agreed to the establishment of an International Seabed Authority
for deep seabed mining, composed of all the parties to the treaty,
which would serve as an umbrella for parallel mining systems.
One side would comprise the mining operations of individual
States or organizations sponsored by States, the other would con-
duct the operations of the international mining Enterprise of the
Authority. Each operator on the State/private enterprise side
would identify two sites, one of which would be reserved to the
Enterprise. The latter could be "banked" for exploitation at a
later time.
With respect to the resources themselves, this system is quite
workable in the sense that there are ample opportunities for all
who may wish to mine in a regime of parallel access. The hard
mineral deposits of the deep seabed are sufficiently vast and suffi-
ciently dispersed to support mining operations by multiple par-
ties.
The framework of the parallel system first surfaced in treaty
language in the Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT),24 which
emerged from the 1976 Spring Session in New York. The more
militant members of the G-77 criticized the document as a
"'sellout" to the United States and demanded a return to the more
unitary approach in the prior Informal Single Negotiating Text
(ISNT).25 However, at that point in time, the parallel system was
at least negotiable.26
24. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. 1, reprinted in 5 UNCLOS m OR 125
(1976).
25. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS Il OR 137, and in 14
INT'L LEGAL MATERALs 689 (1975).
26. "Negotiability" was undoubtedly enhanced by major concessions offered
by then Secretary of State Kissinger when he visited the Sixth Session. His pro-
posals involved United States assistance in financing the Enterprise, a review af-
ter 25 years, and the transfer of technology to the Authority.
Shortly after his appointment by President Carter as our Law
of the Sea Ambassador, and prior to the opening of the Sixth Ses-
sion of UNCLOS I, Elliot L. Richardson indicated that any tenta-
tive agreements which may have been reached at that time
emerged from a realization that there is no effective way in which
seabed resources can be exploited for the general benefit of man-
kind unless there is a practical means of drawing on the technol-
ogy and the capital resources of the mining consortia that have
developed deep seabed mining capability.
27
Unfortunately, if such a realization were evident then, it failed
to persist through the Sixth and Seventh Sessions of UNCLOS
II. The formal and informal discussions during the last two years
and the language of the present basis for negotiation, the Infor-
mal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT),28 clearly show that the
concept of an assured, non-discriminatory, equitable parallel ac-
cess system has been seriously eroded. Interestingly, the Kis-
singer-proposed measures on financing the Enterprise, on the
review clause, and on technology transfer remain "on the table"
for discussion and, in fact, are contained in all recent negotiating
texts.
An international treaty, particularly one with the scope of a uni-
versal Law of the Sea, is an extraordinarily complex document.
There are prefaces, articles, paragraphs, clauses, statements of
policy and principles, and annexes. The ICNT is truly a labyrin-
thian maze. What may seem clear in Article 150 (Policies Relat-
ing to Activities in the Area) and in Article 151 (System of
Exploration and Exploitation) may be rendered economically un-
feasible by Article 150 bis (Production Policies), seriously com-
promised by the paragraphs relating to the transfer of technology
in Annex II, or completely overturned in twenty years by the pro-
visions in Article 153 (The Review Conference).
This article is not intended to be a definitive legal analysis of
the ICNT or of any other negotiating proposal before the Confer-
ence. The point is that the deep and fundamental conceptual dif-
ferences which separate the developing world from the industrial
nations are reflected in the types of issues that increasingly are
finding their ways into negotiating texts but which, hopefully, are
not yet settled.
Some issues relate to the nature of the new International Au-
27. The Law of the Sea Conference and Its Aftermath, AM. Soc'y INT'L L. Pnoc.
107, 108 (1977) (remarks by Elliot L. Richardson).
28. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS I OR 1, and in 16
INT'L LEGAL MATERALuS 1108 (1977). The ICNT emerged from the Sixth Session
(1977) under circumstances that raised serious questions about the basic procedu-
ral due process of the Conference.
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thority-to its international structure, its voting arrangements,
the scope of its powers, and its procedures for the settlement of
disputes. Others involve the relationship between the Authority
and the organizations that may wish to engage in mining. They
cover such matters as the qualifications of an applicant seeking
authorization to mine, the advance fees a mining organization
must pay, production controls, the transfer of technology by an
organization to the Authority, and the rights of mining organiza-
tions with respect to proprietary data and to the recovered miner-
als.
Whereas the industrial world wants to create a climate that will
stimulate private investment, the G-77 wants to ensure that all as-
pects of deep seabed mining are centrally controlled-even at the
risk of seriously constraining the investment climate. This differ-
ence in philosophy is reflected in the kind of treaty text that each
group wants. The developed nations want precision, clarity, and
predictability--limiting future uncertainty with respect to secur-
ity of tenure and contractual obligations. The developing nations,
however, prefer a more generalized text-one that sets forth
broad principles but leaves the implementation of these princi-
ples to the International Authority.
The widely disparate perceptions and goals of the developed
and the developing nations are not only many and deep, they are
persistent. They have continued for the full term of the Confer-
ence, and although one can see occasional movement on one or
another issue, there is as yet no sign that the nations participat-
ing in UNCLOS I can resolve their fundamental differences on
deep seabed mining. An impasse may have been reached.
THE NEED FOR DOMESTIC LEGISLATION
For the United States, the impasse has created a dilemma. On
the one hand, the United States is committed to the concept of a
new and comprehensive Law of the Sea. It does not want the
Conference to fail, although the consequences of failure may not
be nearly as severe as some predict. On the other hand, it cannot
permit ocean mining operations to remain stalled. The work of re-
search and development is very advanced, but continuing ad-
vances in technology will be necessary. The mining companies
have formed consortia to engage in deep seabed mining on a com-
mercial scale, technology teams have been assembled and are in
place, and the industry is ready to commit large capital sums to
this work if proper investment conditions can be established.
There is now a sense of momentum, of forward movement. But
if nothing happens, if the mining companies cannot begin to
mount actual operations, this momentum will be lost. Technology
teams will be disbanded, operational planning will come to a halt,
and investment capital will be diverted to other areas of activity.
It may be possible at a later date to resurrect the elements that
are providing the present sense of progress, but only with great
difficulty. Beyond all this, of course, is the pressing need for the
minerals themselves-for the short term, to meet critical
shortages that may be created by unstable market forces; for the
long term, to meet fundamental world requirements.
The slow pace of the UNCLOS II negotiations can no longer
dictate the pace of development of deep seabed mining. The
ocean mining industry, which is a new and infant enterprise, is
too fragile, the international markets for the scarce minerals
found on the ocean floor are too volatile, and the world's needs for
these minerals are too important. The forward movement of deep
seabed mining should be actively encouraged, not brought to a
halt while the Conference makes its slow way from negotiating
session to negotiating session. Because there is no international
mechanism yet in place for the development of ocean mining, the
United States must act unilaterally-through domestic legisla-
tion-to provide a proper regulatory framework. This does not
mean that the United States must or should turn its back on the
current international efforts to create a new Law of the Sea. It is
possible to devise domestic legislation that will permit ocean min-
ing operations to commence and that, at the same time, will not
prejudice the formation of a new international regime.
It is now the position of the administration that the establish-
ment of a domestic legal framework within which our companies
can operate must be considered independently of the Conference.
Even if the international negotiations are successful reasonably
soon (an extraordinary assumption), there will be a number of
years between final ratification by the signatory nations and ac-
tual implementation of the international management machinery.
It is not in the interest of the world community to expect deep
seabed resource development to be held in abeyance until that
time.
In recent testimony before a congressional committee, Ambas-
sador Richardson summarized the United States' position with re-
spect to domestic seabed mining legislation:
I think it should be clear... that the question of whether or not the
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United States should legislate on this subject ought no longer to be gov-
erned by the question of progress or the lack thereof at the Conference.
In my earlier testimony in support of legislation this year, I made clear
that the considerations underlying that support by the administration are
considerations independent of the Conference. I pointed out that there
would be a need for some legal framework for deep seabed mining in any
event between the outcome of a successful Conference and the effective
date on which a comprehensive treaty would come into force. That is go-
ing to be a period of a considerable number of years at best.
Beyond that, the companies contemplating seabed mining are facing
difficult decisions as to whether or not to continue to invest money in the
development and testing of deep seabed mining technology. They need to
make those decisions now before they can know definitively what the out-
come of the Conference will be.
I pointed out further that the contemplated legislation is interim in
character on its face. It would be superseded by an eventual treaty and
finally it is, so far as we can make it so, consonant in its terms with those
provisions on the exploitation of the seabed that have so far been negoti-
ated at the Conference.
From all this, in my view, it follows that we should seek to convey to our
fellow participants in the Conference an understanding of these points in
order to mitigate the adverse impact that might follow from final passage
rather than to stay our hand at the costs that I have identified.2 9
It has not been entirely clear to some observers why legislation
is necessary if, in fact, seabed mining is a high seas freedom. Is it
not possible for a company to engage in deep seabed mining now?
It would be possible and legal to begin mining now, but the com-
panies are rightfully concerned about their security of tenure
with respect to any seabed area vis-A-vis other United States or
foreign nationals.
Compounding this problem is the high degree of uncertainty
created by UNCLOS III. To the extent that a treaty could termi-
nate industry's operations under existing international law, pro-
hibit mining activities, limit production, fix prices, require
transference to a new mining site, or raise costs prohibitively,
lending institutions will not loan any substantial part of the risk
capital needed to move toward commercial operations.
It is important, then, that a legal framework be created which
addresses these security of tenure problems. The legitimacy and
sanction of the United States government with respect to mining
activities, pursuant to a program established by the Congress, is a
critical function of legislation.
29. Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978) (statement of
Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson).
A second feature of any domestic program relates to the high
seas principle that each nation may regulate the activities of its
nationals on the high seas. At present, the United States govern-
ment has no program for the control of high seas mining activity,
including the protection of the marine environment. This is
clearly a needed element if the seabed is to be mined in a safe
and environmentally sound manner.
It is imperative, therefore, that a strong legal framework be es-
tablished-a framework within which the industry may obtain se-
curity of tenure, and the government may exercise its normal
functions of regulation and administration.
The most important legislative vehicle in the 95th Congress was
H.R. 3350, the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act.3 0 It was
subject to one of the most vigorous and intense deliberations ever
afforded to any piece of congressional legislation. It was fash-
ioned in such a way as to be, in Ambassador Richardson's words,
"consonant in its terms with those provisions on the exploitation
of the seabed that have so far been negotiated at the Confer-
ence."
3 1
H.R. 3350 contained several such features. It was interim in na-
ture, pending a successful Law of the Sea Convention that might
come into force and effect with respect to the United States. It
recognized United States support for the Declaration of Principles
and noted that the common heritage of mankind would be legally
defined by a Law of the Sea treaty. The bill explicitly stated that
one of its purposes was to encourage the successful negotiation of
a treaty, and, pending such an agreement, it established a reve-
nue-sharing fund the proceeds of which were to be shared by the
international community pursuant to a treaty. Those who held
licenses and permits under the Act could not engage in any activi-
ties that interfered with the interests of other nations in their
exercise of the freedoms of the high seas, conflict with any inter-
national obligation of the United States, or pose an unreasonable
threat to the quality of the environment. The bill also contained
an explicit disclaimer which stated that by enacting the deep sea-
bed mining program, the United States was not asserting sover-
eignty or sovereign or exclusive rights over, or the ownership of,
any area of the deep seabed. Rather, it was simply exercising its
proper jurisdiction to regulate United States citizens in the carry-
ing out of ocean mining activities on the high seas. In an effort to
30. H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
31. Status Report on Law of the Sea Conference: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978) (statement of
Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson).
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facilitate the transition from this domestic program to one under
an international regime, the section in the bill that stipulated the
criteria on which regulations were to be promulgated was based,
in large measure, on Annex II of the RSNT-a part of the UN-
CLOS II negotiations that has generally not been in dispute.
H.R. 3350, therefore, was carefully structured to be as consistent
as possible with the international negotiations and with the prin-
ciples of the freedom of the high seas. At the same time, it ad-
dressed the security of tenure issues by establishing a licensing
and permitting process. No United States citizen could interfere
with the activities authorized by a license or permit, and the pos-
sibility that interference from foreign nationals would also be pro-
hibited was enhanced by the authorization to enter into reciprocal
arrangements with other nations engaged in mining. With respect
to the security of tenure problems associated with UNCLOS III,
the bill contained a statement of congressional intent that any in-
ternational agreement should provide assured and non-discrimi-
natory access to the resources, under reasonable terms and
conditions, to United States citizens. For those United States citi-
zens who had commenced mining activities prior to an interna-
tional convention, the statement called for the continuation of
those operations under similar terms as were imposed by the do-
mestic legislation and in such a manner as to avoid unreasonable
impairment of the value of the investments made in relation to
such operations.
Although a statement of congressional intent is not binding on
the UNCLOS HI in general, or on the United States negotiators in
particular, it does represent the strong feeling on the part of the
Congress about what type of regime should be established by the
Conference and what protections should be provided for those op-
erations that are in existence at the time a treaty goes into force
and effect. Clearly this type of statement is important to the in-
dustry with respect to its investment decisions. It is also impor-
tant to the nations participating in UNCLOS III with respect to
the type of treaty for which the chances of United States Senate
ratification would be enhanced and of full congressional support
of subsequent implementation legislation would be increased.
H.R. 3350, then, was a measure that delicately balanced many
competing interests and would have established a sound and ra-
tional management program for our domestic needs while care-
fully fulfilling our international obligations. The story of the
ocean mining bill, nevertheless, is a classic case of the obstacles
involved in passing major legislation in the Congress. It was ac-
ted upon and favorably reported by four committees in the House
and three committees in the Senate. When it was considered by
the full House of Representatives, it was overwhelmingly adopted
by a vote of 312 to 80, representing the first time that the House
had passed deep seabed mining legislation. Unfortunately, in the
closing days of the 95th Congress, because of procedural and par-
liamentary problems, the bill never reached the floor of the Sen-
ate. Consequently, it died when the Congress adjourned.
However, it will be reintroduced at the beginning of the 96th Con-
gress. Given that all the major substantive problems were re-
solved in the last session, the probability is very high that the bill
will be expeditiously considered by the Congress and sent to the
President-perhaps before adjournment of the Eighth Session of
UNCLOS IH.
CONCLUSION: THE INTERNATIONAL BENEFITS FROM DOMESTIC
LEGISLATION
The deep seabed mining debate, within the Conference itself,
within the United States Congress, and among other interested
observers, is often filled with animosity and misunderstanding.
Frequently cast in terms of the rich versus the poor, the level of
rhetoric is dysfunctional for meaningful negotiations and com-
pletely overlooks the common interests that all nations have in
the development of the seabed. When the next session of UN-
CLOS III convenes, it should be a time for some sober reflections,
rational negotiations, and factual observations about the state of
the world's economy with respect to mineral resources.
The reason commercial exploitation of seabed resources has
never before been undertaken lies in the historically high cost of
producing minerals from the ocean, particularly when compared
to the relatively low cost of producing those minerals from abun-
dant land-based ores. However, over the past decade the value of
the metals contained in nodules has more than doubled and has
risen by fifty percent more than either the United States' whole-
sale price index or the International Monetary Fund index of
world traded goods.
At the same time, the technological environment within which
efficient ocean mining techniques could be generated has been
greatly improved. This improvement is largely attributable to
techniques developed by the rapidly growing offshore oil indus-
try. Also, as ocean mining becomes potentially cheaper, land-
based mining is becoming increasingly expensive. This juxtaposi-
[voL 16: 531, 1979] Politics of Manganese Nodules
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
tion is caused both by dramatic declines in ore quality and acces-
sibility and by increased infrastructure costs as more isolated
land-based deposits are brought under development.
Additionally, the world is moving into a period in which there is
a shift from a buyer's to a seller's market for most raw materials.
This shift greatly increases the probability of the formation of sta-
ble cartels. Many land-based producers of minerals are now oper-
ating at near-monopoly prices-prima facie evidence that they al-
ready wield considerable market power.
Deep seabed mining can restore competition to the world mar-
ket that would result in lower mineral prices for all. The eco-
nomic benefit from competition would be worldwide and would
include even those nations most adamantly opposed to an equita-
ble seabed mining structure.
This article has pointed out that much of what one sees in the
confrontation between the industrialized nations and the Third
World is a fundamental difference in the perception of what role
the United States and others are to play in long-range human de-
velopment. The nations of the world should recognize that the
knowledge and technological capability necessary for recovery of
seabed nodules, and not the nodules themselves, are the true re-
sources. The oil, gas, minerals, and other resources that the world
began using about a century ago had been held by the earth for
millions of years. What was lacking through all these years of
human history was the knowledge required to make use of these
resources. The industrial and technological development that has
been undertaken through major investments of capital and labor
has unleashed these resources for the benefit of all-not just
some-nations.
In view of this development, one should properly view the non-
renewable resources that the world is using not as finite wealth
that the industrialized world is squandering, but as a fortunate
accident of nature that has given us the luxury of time to learn
processes that will ultimately bring mankind into a world of truly
abundant wealth.
Each new technological project is an important part of this
learning process. What the world learns from deep seabed min-
ing may be far more important in the long run than the minerals
that are recovered. The knowledge gained will be beneficial for
all people and all nations. This is precisely why it is imperative
that the exploration and development of the oceans be strongly
encouraged by the world community-and not be delayed any
further by an international Conference which, to this point, has
been severely constrained by ideological and conceptual differ-
ences of the most fundamental nature.
In this regard, then, the case for domestic legislation is over-
whelming. This article has outlined the various economic, legal,
and political considerations involved in the issue and the
problems associated with the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea. In total, the frequently heard argument that leg-
islation would disrupt and perhaps destroy the negotiations has
little merit.
Rather, legislation of the type described above will have posi-
tive economic benefits for the entire world, encourage further
technological advances now that can form the basis for a future
international regime, and persuade the negotiating nations that
the time has come for the good faith bargaining essential for a
widely accepted treaty.
The United States has been severely criticized for moving to-
ward unilateral action on this issue. Paradoxically, unilateral do-
mestic legislation may yet make the most significant contribution
to the establishment of an international regime for ocean mining.
